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Abstract
A set of players have preferences over a set of outcomes. We consider the problem of an "information
designer" who can choose an information structure for the players to serve his ends, but has no ability to
change the mechanism (or force the players to make particular action choices). We describe a unifying
perspective for information design. We consider a simple example of Bayesian persuasion with both an
uninformed and informed receiver. We extend information design to many players and relate it to the
literature on incomplete information correlated equilibrium.
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A set of players have preferences over a set of outcomes. Consider the problem of an "information designer"
who can choose an information structure for the players to serve his ends, but has no ability to change
the mechanism (or force the players to make particular action choices). A mechanism here describes
the set of players, their available actions and a mapping from action profiles to outcomes. Contrast
this "information design" problem with the "mechanism design" problem, where a "mechanism designer"
can choose a mechanism for the players to serve his ends, but has no ability to choose the information
structure (or force the players to make particular action choices).1 In each case, the problem is sometimes
studied with a restricted choice set. In the information design problem, we could restrict the designer
to choose whether the players are given no information or complete information about the environment.
In the mechanism design problem, we could restrict the designer to choose between a first price and a
second price auction. However, in each case, there is a revelation principle argument that allows for the
analysis of all information structures or all mechanisms respectively. For the mechanism design problem,
we can restrict attention to direct mechanisms where the players’action sets are equal their possible types.
Conversely, for the information design problem, we can restrict attention to information structures where
the players’ type sets are equal to their action sets. In this note, using this observation, we consider
information design problems when all information structures are available to the designer.
When there are many players, but the information designer (or "mediator") has no informational
advantage over the players, this problem reduces to the analysis of communication in games (Myerson
(1991)). If there is only one player (or "receiver") but the information designer (or "sender") has an
informational advantage over the player, the problem reduces to the "Bayesian persuasion" problem (Ka-
menica and Gentzkow (2011)). Some of our recent work corresponds to the information design problem
when there are both many players and the information designer has an informational advantage over the
players (Bergemann and Morris (2013), (2016)).
This note explores this unifying perspective on information design. In the next section, we discuss the
simplest example of Bayesian persuasion, with both an uninformed and informed receiver. We provide
a couple of novel perspectives with this treatment. First, we consider "omniscient persuasion" in the
informed receiver case, where the sender knows the receiver’s signal, contrasting this with the more usual
assumptions that the receiver either cannot condition on the receiver’s signal or can only do so if he can
elicit this information from the receiver. Second, we use a two step procedure to solve the problem, by first
characterizing the set of outcomes that could be attained by the sender and then analyzing the sender’s
1We follow Taneva (2015) in our use of the term "information design".
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choice of outcome among those that are attainable.2 These novel perspectives are of independent interest
for the Bayesian persuasion literature. But more importantly, they also clarify how the analysis extends
to the many player case. In the final section, we report the extension to the many player case, discuss the
connection to the incomplete information correlated equilibrium literature and survey our own applied and
theoretical work in this area. While the discussion in this note is informal, a companion piece (Bergemann
and Morris (2016b)) discusses these connections formally.
2 A Bayesian Persuasion Example
A bank is solvent in a good state (G) and insolvent in a bad state (B). A depositor can either run (r)
or stay (s)with the bank. Each state of the world is equally likely a priori. A regulator can design the
depositor’s information in order to influence his behavior. For the depositor, the payoff from staying with
the bank is −1 if the bank is insolvent, and y if solvent, with 0 < y < 1; the payoff for running is normalized
to 0 in either state. The regulator seeks to minimize the probability of the depositor running. This is
the leading example of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), with the information designer being a regulator
(instead of a prosecutor) and the single player being a depositor (instead of a judge). We rephrase this
example in order to tie the analysis with the many player generalization discussed in Section 3.
2.1 The Uninformed Depositor Case
We briefly review the analysis of Bayesian persuasion with an uninformed depositor (receiver). We describe
the receiver’s behavior by a decision rule specifying his behavior given the true state of the world, writing
ρθ for the probability that he will run in each state θ ∈ {B,G}; thus a decision rule is a pair (ρG, ρB).
We can think of a decision rule as being a (stochastic) action recommendation from an informed mediator.
A decision rule is obedient if the depositor always has an incentive to follow the action recommendation.
The depositor will then have an incentive to stay if
(1/2) (1− ρG) y − (1/2) (1− ρB) ≥ 0, (1)
and an incentive to run if
0 ≥ (1/2) ρGy + (1/2) ρB (−1) . (2)
Obedience conditions reflect the fact that the agent may have information (that we do not need to describe
explicitly) that leads him to act differently across the two states, hence ρG and ρB may differ in value.
2We thus do not appeal to a concavification argument (Aumann and Maschler (1995)) which is useful to solve this problem
at least in specific settings (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)).
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Since y < 1, (1) is always the binding constraint and we can rewrite (1) as
ρB ≥ 1− y + yρG. (3)
Thus in any obedient decision rule, the probability of running in the bad state has to exceed the probability
of running in the good state, with the difference being at least 1− y. In particular, staying with the bank
for sure can never be an equilibrium. The regulator’s preferred outcome, with the lowest probability of
running across states, has ρG = 0 and ρB = 1− y.
Now any obedient decision rule corresponds to optimal behavior under some information structure.
For the regulator’s preferred outcome, it suffi ces to give the depositor a bad signal with probability 1− y
if the state is bad, and otherwise always give the depositor a good signal. From the point of view of
the motivating example, this corresponds to a regulator running stress tests to obfuscate the state of a
bank in order to prevent a run. By pooling good and bad states in this way, the depositor is made
indifferent between running and staying. More generally, any obedient decision rule can always arise when
the depositor is given a signal equal to his action recommendation.
2.2 The Informed Depositor Case
Now suppose that the depositor receives information, independent of the regulator. We assume that the
depositor receives a signal which is "correct" with probability q > 1/2. Formally, the depositor observes
a signal g or b, with signals g and b being observed with conditionally independent probability q when the
true state is G or B respectively.
The depositor’s information will act as a constraint on the ability of the regulator to influence the
depositor’s decision, since he now has less control over the depositor’s information. In this enriched
setting, a decision rule specifies the probability that the depositor receives a recommendation to run, as a
function of both the state and the signal. We will write ρθt for the probability of running in state θ ∈ {G,B}
if the signal is t ∈ {g, b}. A decision rule is now described by the quadruple
(
ρBb, ρGb, ρBg, ρGg
)
.
Omniscient Persuasion. The analysis of the informed depositor case will depend on what the
regulator knows about the depositor’s information. We first consider the case where the regulator knows
the information of the depositor as well as the state and, in this sense, is omniscient. This case has not
been the focus of the Bayesian persuasion literature with an informed receiver. However, it is a natural
case and, in some cases, the most natural case to consider. For example, a regulator may know the
information available to the depositor (in the form of newspapers, public reports, etc.). And while the
regulator may be unable to suppress that information, he may be able to condition the information he
releases on the depositor’s initial information.
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The obedience constraints now reflect the conditional belief of the agent about the state given the
realization of the signal. The obedience condition for depositor who observes a good signal and an action










The obedience condition for a depositor who observes a good signal but an action recommendation to run
is:
0 ≥ qρGgy − (1− q) ρBg. (5)
As long as the private information of the agent is suffi ciently noisy, or q ≤ 1/ (1 + y), the binding constraint
is (4), otherwise it is the inequality (5) that determines the conditional probabilities. The obedience
conditions for the bad type are derived in an analogous manner. The obedience conditions are defined type
by type and we compute the restrictions on the conditional probabilities averaged across types. Now the
decision rule
(
ρBb, ρGb, ρBg, ρGg
)
will induce behavior (ρB, ρG) integrating over signals t ∈ {g, b}.
Proposition 1 (Omniscient Persuasion) The probabilities (ρB, ρG) form an equilibrium outcome for
some information structure if:
ρB ≥ max {q (1 + y) , 1} − y + yρG. (6)
The behavior of the equilibrium set as a function of the precision q of the private information is
illustrated in Figure 2.2. As the private information becomes precise and q approaches one, we converge
to the complete information outcome with ρB = 1, ρG = 0. The depositor’s private information thus limits
the regulator’s ability to influence the depositor’s decision as the private information tightens obedience
constraints.
But if the regulator had to elicit the depositor’s information, the constraints imposed by the private
information would become even more severe. We briefly contrast omniscient persuasion with this case.
Private Persuasion. We now consider a screening problem where the regulator offers a recommenda-
tion, a probability of running as a function of the reported type and the true state. Kolotilin, Li, Mylovanov,
and Zapechelnyuk (2015) refer to this informational environment as "private persuasion".3 We now have
three set of constraints. First, each type has to truthfully report his type; second, each type has to be
willing to follow the recommendation, the obedience constraints; and third, double deviations, by means
of misreporting and disobeying at the same time are not profitable. With these additional constraints,
the set of outcomes that can arise in equilibrium with private persuasion is strictly smaller than under
omniscient persuasion as can be seen by comparison between the blue and red areas in Figure 2.2. We
3Bergemann, Bonatti, and Smolin (2015) analyze this environment with monetary transfers.
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can verify that the truthtelling constraints impose restrictions on how the differences in the conditional
probabilities across signals can vary across states. This imposes additional restrictions on the ability of













Figure 2.2. Bayesian persuasion with an informed receiver (blue)
and private persuasion (red)
for y = 9/10 and q = 0.575, 0.7, 0.825.
Public Persuasion. A yet more restrictive model of persuasion with an informed receiver is to assume
that the sender not only does not know the receiver’s private information but cannot elicit it. Kolotilin, Li,
Mylovanov, and Zapechelnyuk (2015) call this scenario "public persuasion." Such public persuasion has
been the focus of the recent literature. In our example, one can show that any outcome that is attainable by
private persuasion is attainable by public persuasion. Kolotilin, Li, Mylovanov, and Zapechelnyuk (2015)
identify suffi cient conditions for an equivalence.
7
3 The Many Player Case
Omniscient persuasion is the one player version of an approach to information design that we have been
pursuing in recent work (Bergemann and Morris (2016a)). As in the analysis of omniscient persuasion
presented here, our work suggests a two step procedure to information design. First, what are the set of
outcomes that could arise for all extra information with which the players could be endowed? Second,
which of those outcomes would be chosen by some interested party (and what is the information structure
giving rise to those outcomes)?
We have analyzed the first step with many players by giving a general characterization of the set of
outcomes that could arise in some equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris (2016a)). We consider a joint
distribution of states, initial information signals and action profiles that satisfy the relevant obedience
constraints: that is, the constraint that each player is always choosing a best response given that he knows
his initial signal and the action that he is going to play. We call such distributions "Bayes correlated
equilibria," since they correspond to one (very permissive) version of incomplete information correlated
equilibrium. This set clearly reduces to the set of outcomes attainable by omniscient persuasion in the
one player case. We have characterized the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in the context of price
discrimination and auctions (Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2015a), (2015b)) and symmetric linear best
response games with normal signals (Bergemann and Morris (2013), Bergemann, Heumann, and Morris
(2015) and others). In these applications, we consider both the case where players have initial information
(as in omniscient persuasion) and the case where players have no initial information (as in Bayesian
persuasion with an uninformed receiver).
The second step of an information design procedure is to identify the information structure that would
be chosen by an interested designer. This step has not been the focus of our earlier analysis. However, our
results can and have been used to make "information design" observations. One novel question that arises
in the many player information design is whether the information designer wants to convey information to
the players in the form of private or public signals. If the information designer would like the players’actions
to be correlated, then he will choose to give them public signals, whereas if the designer wants the players’
actions to be uncorrelated, then he will choose private signals. If he wants the actions to be as uncorrelated
as possible, then (conditional on the amount of payoff relevant information conveyed to the players), he
would like signals to be as uncorrelated as possible. We have studied the case where an information
designer acts in the joint interest of the players. In the appendix of Bergemann and Morris (2016a), we
analyze a two player, two action, two state example that is the generalization of the one player example
above. In this case, public signals are best for the information designer under strategic complementarities
(e.g., with the usual payoffs for a many player bank run) while private signals are best under strategic
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substitutes. Our analysis of information sharing in oligopoly in Bergemann and Morris (2013) followed the
same logic. Under oligopoly (where actions are strategic substitutes), firms would like to have accurate
information about demand. But they would also like their actions to be as uncorrelated as possible (since
each firm would produce more when other firms are producing less). There is a conflict between these two
objectives. We show that the optimal information structure trades off these two competing objectives by
having firms observe conditionally independent noisy signals of demand. In the elegant dynamic two player
analysis of Ely (2015), the information designer wants to minimize the probability of both players running,
and thus wants uncorrelated actions, and thus chooses signals which are as uncorrelated as possible.
A striking feature of the one player example is that the set of attainable outcomes shrinks as the
receiver becomes more informed. This monotonicity arises because (i) the sender has the option of giving
the receiver any information that he wants, and thus less information does not limit the feasible outcomes for
the receiver, while (ii) more information implies tighter obedience constraints for the sender. In a general
omniscient persuasion analysis, there is a tight generalization of this observation: fixing a state space, the
set of attainable outcomes shrinks in all decision problems if and only if there is more information, in
the sense of the Blackwell’s suffi ciency order. This result also extends to the many player case: more
information reduces the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in all games, and vice versa. The subtlety in this
statement is formalizing what is meant by "more information" in the many player case. In Bergemann
and Morris (2016a), we identify the relevant many player generalization of Blackwell’s order under which
this result is tight.
We can make a tight connection between the three versions of persuasion discussed in this note and
the incomplete information correlated equilibrium literature. As discussed in the introduction, persua-
sion problems have an informed information designer choosing information for a single player while the
communication in games literature has an information designer with no informational advantage choosing
information for many players. The latter scenario corresponds to the classic incomplete information corre-
lated equilibrium literature. Omniscient persuasion corresponds to the Bayesian solution of Forges (1993):
the mediator is able to condition his recommendation on any information possessed by the players jointly;
private persuasion corresponds to the communication equilibria of Forges (1993), where the mediator is
able only to condition on information that players can be induced to report truthfully; and public persua-
sion corresponds to the strategic form correlated equilibrium of Forges (1993), where a mediator cannot
condition on players’ information at all. Our work on Bayes correlated equilibria generalizes omniscient
persuasion by allowing many players and generalizes the Bayesian solution by allowing the information
designer to have information that the players do not collectively possess.
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